IS THIS MORE EVIDENCE THAT ISRAEL TRIED TO PROVOKE A WAR WITH LEBANON?

In Israel there is currently an investigation into what happened before and during the debacle between Lebanon and Israel this summer. We have since discovered that Israel had been planning for exactly what happened, kidnap of soldiers on the border, which explains why Israel was able to respond so swiftly with a such a slick and lethal response. There are conflicting reports as to where exactly the soldiers were when they were kidnapped. Even though they knew, it now appears as though sections within the Israeli power structure did not want the soldiers on the border to know where Hizb'Allah cells were on the border, thus increasing the likelihood of a confrontation between Israel and Hizb'Allah which could then be used as a pretext for just plain violence and murder of Lebanese civilians by Israel with indiscriminating air raids with DU bombs flown from the USA via Scotland. A similar tactic to provoke and allow confrontation was made in 1941 at Pearl Harbour, when FDR and his inner circle provoked Japan and knew the Japanese fleet was sailing full steam ahead to Pearl Harbour but did not tell Admiral Kimmel, and when Kimmel fearing war was close put the Pacific fleet out to sea he was told by FDR to put it back into dock at Pearl Harbour!!

So what have we learned today? The military should NEVER, EVER, EVER trust its politicians

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From http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/783572.html

Key data withheld from army officers during Lebanon war

By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz Correspondents

Senior officers Northern Command and Division 91 officers were not privy to essential intelligence information regarding Hezbollah's deployment prior to the second Lebanon War.

The intelligence, which was available to the Israel Defense Forces, included accurate information about Hezbollah bunkers and positions, as well as the internal structure of such positions.

The officers were aware that such information existed, but were prevented by the Intelligence Directorate's Committee on Source Security, claiming that the information was secret. Military Intelligence decided that the information would only be made available in the event of a war.

Officers' demands to gain access to information on routine security preparations that could counter Hezbollah raids inside the border fence were also rejected, and led to repeated and heated arguments among various units.

The information on Hezbollah positions was also withheld from the units during the war itself. Although there was a plan to transfer the data, which was stored in sealed boxes, to relevant units during a war, it was not carried out in time.

The initial boxes of intelligence reached the division command only a week after the initial encounter between an elite IDF unit and Hezbollah guerrillas inside a bunker (on July 19). But even then, it was difficult to adapt the intelligence to the immediate needs of the unit fighting there.