The way David Aaronovitch writes in The Times implies to me that he is ready to sign up and get out to Afghanistan. So somebody, please, give him a gun and fly him over there as soon as possible and save us from this classic warmonger.
He is like the writers who on or immediately after 11th September 2001 all cried war.
Send our boys now!
We need to kill the X, Y and Z who did this!
Such writers were the Kagans and the Kristols of this world, all proclaiming war and vowing revenge without any serious investigation but nowhere to be found when the uniforms and guns were being handed out.
Mr A believes, apparently, the usual bollocks;
this enemy came out of nowhere
they are evil
they need to be stopped
I'll repeat that again but with some fun.
this enemy came out of nowhere (they were financed by the CIA via the Pakistan ISI and everything they did was watched and recorded).
they are evil (they were taught a radical version of Islam derived from a British agent Hempher)
they need to be stopped (they almost eradicated the opium harvests and asked too much in the way of tribute for fossil fuel pipelines across their turf)
All these people like Mr A, the Kagans, Kristol etc. They can't wait to send us to war and can find all sorts of excuses to support war but suddenly become invisible when the volunteers are required, and all you see is a cloud of dust as they run for their lives.
So David get out there now as a private and save us from the monsters (that our beloved intelligence agencies created for the purpose of war in the area of the world containing the largest known fossil fuel reserves).
Here's what I would do instead of spending hundreds of billions every year on a military conflict overseas and a police state at home;
1. follow the money - stop all British, American and Israeli covert financing of the Taliban and their supporters
2. pay double what opium farmers are paid for their crop and and then pay them to grow pomegranates and other fruit and veg they can sell
3. put on public trial any western agent collaborating with the Taliban and others
4. inform the British, American an Isreali public of the PNAC/Clean Break agenda.
This is something that Mr A could support because...it doesn't involve him flying out there with nothing but a helmet and gun to save him from heaven (or hell).
=====================
From http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/david_aaronovitch/article6725468.ece
From The Times
July 24, 2009
The troops leave. And then the horrors begin
Opponents of the war in Afghanistan ignore the consequences of withdrawal. We supporters live with the price of staying
David Aaronovitch
Almost exactly 30 years ago, in the summer of 1979, an IRA double ambush killed 18 British soldiers near the town of Warrenpoint in Northern Ireland. Among them was the commanding officer of the Queens Own Highlanders, Lieutenant-Colonel David Blair. It was the worst single incident during a campaign that lasted nearly two decades and cost more than 700 military lives.
Yet, despite the occasional opinion poll suggesting that the Irish should be left to sort things out for themselves, and a desultory Troops Out campaign waged by the Daily Mirror, there was never any great public movement for withdrawal.
Three years later, though still mired in Ulster, British Forces travelled thousands of miles to liberate some barely populated islands from Argentina, at a cost of 258 Service personnel. The call for the troops to be brought home, or for Mrs Thatcher somehow subsequently to account for the losses, hardly registered.
Why are things so different now, in Afghanistan, where the increase in military deaths seems to have prompted a widespread public unease? It could be linked, one supposes, to the myth that somehow Britain is alone in this battle or taking the lion’s miserable share of the dying. How many people know that, in relation to population size Canada has lost a third more soldiers than we have and Denmark has lost 50 per cent more? Perhaps they too have their debates about helicopters, and imagine wars in which none of their soldiers dies.
It was easier, it seems to me, for pro-warriors in the past. They’d talk up their wars, censorship would keep the worst of it from filtering back home at least for a while, and they could always deploy the language of patriotism against those who demurred. Defeatists, they called them, giving succour to the enemy. Soldiers know they risk their lives, and you the doubters put them doubly at risk.
I’m glad that this form of bullying cannot be done any more. I’m glad that every life we lose or whose loss we inflict has to be argued over and explained, from root to crown of the whole tree of conflict. The onus is on those of us who believe that we are right to be in Afghanistan constantly to re-explain why.
Maybe we’ve done too little of it. With some important exceptions (here I recommend my colleague, Matthew Parris) I am struck by the paucity of the case against our involvement, by the failure of many opponents to engage with even the most basic and obvious objections to their proposals for withdrawal.
Here is a paraphrase of a typical withdrawalist prospectus: failure is inevitable, intervention was historically pre-doomed, the idea of “Western-style democracy” in Afghanistan is a delusion, in any case there is mission creep, we are only there to please the Americans, sooner or later the Taleban will win, better to get out. And that’s it. As for what happens next, let’s not go there.
Because, of course, we’ve been there. The New Statesman magazine a week ago reminded its readers that it had opposed the invasion of Afghanistan back in the autumn of 2001, but failed to remind them of what it had advocated instead.
Perhaps a mythical surgical strike to take out bin Laden somehow but otherwise leaving Taleban-ruled Afghanistan alone? Perhaps nothing at all other than a change in Western policy is sufficient — as if by magic — to placate the forces now rising in the region?
For others the implication is that we could have gone in, done for al-Qaeda and come out again — almost precisely mirroring the policy of neglect that followed the Soviet defeat, when we countenanced the country’s descent into warlordism, followed by the Taleban, followed by al-Qaeda.
These were the same days when “we” — as represented by pre-9/11 George Bush — certainly did not believe in nation-building. If the lessons of history tell us of the dangers of intervention, they also tell us something just as important about hit-and-run — something visible in the lost statues of Bamiyan, the executed of the Kabul football stadium, the murder of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the reduction of women to the status of slaves — no, lower than slaves — the spread of jihadism and the fall of the twin towers.
So, going in, we couldn’t just run out. That’s mission creep for you: the mission changes. Of course it does; ask the shade of Abraham Lincoln. Once there, we could hardly have had no view of what came after, even if we most certainly have not insisted on the “perfect” democracy of the sneering caricature.
And if we were to pull out now (and forget here the question of relationships with our allies, and imagine that they do the same), what then? Happy, peaceful Taleban, alone to do what they will with their statues and women, free to find their own way to God and content to allow everyone else to do the same? Happy fundamentalists of Swat, uninflamed by trans-border bombings, taking their part in a peaceful Pakistan? What fanciful rubbish! If, pace Lord Malloch-Brown, Afghanistan is not a big external security threat right now, that is precisely because our young men and women are fighting and dying in Helmand.
Strangely (or perhaps not so strangely) the troops that I have heard interviewed seem to grasp this point better than many back home. They have few illusions about the Taleban, seeing them at closer quarters; they seem to know that the return of the Taleban is not what Afghans want; they envisage what might happen in Pakistan after a Taleban victory; and, unlike some observers on the Left whose insouciance on this point is literally sickening, they comprehend the damage done to a society by the enslavement of its women. Our young soldiers seem to realise that a people cannot advance if half its number — the half that brings the children into the world — is, in effect, held in ignorant, violent and unhealthy servitude.
So the difference between those who advocate staying and those who argue for leaving is this: the goers refuse to spell out the consequences of their advocacy, while the stayers must live with the constant price exacted by theirs. On the whole I don’t believe that we do retreat into the dopey bubble of magical thinking, of thinking that 20 more helicopters will mean no more dead teenagers. We know it’s hard and we may not succeed. But we have to do it. And we have to keep explaining why.
No comments:
Post a Comment