RIFKIND WANTS THE LIBYAN AL QAEDA REBS ARMED

Malcolm Rifkind, who really pushed for military action in Libya, is now joining in the calls to arm the al-Qaeda rebs in Libya. Rifkind also acts as an al-Qaeda PR agent in suggesting that the rebs not be called rebs but insurgents or opposition fighters instead.

Rifkind's three point plan in assisting the al-Qaeda rebs (sorry Malcolm, that's what they are) is
1. call the al-Qaeda rebs insurgents or opposition fighters
2. formal discussions with the Libyan National Council
3. the overt or covert supply of military equipment to the al-Qaeda rebs

Points 2 and 3 go well beyond the letter and spirit of UN SCR 1973.

These suggestions would drag us into a civil war in Libya. But that is a moot point.

As reported in The Daily Mail today several hundred SAS have been in Libya for a month at least, obviously interfering in the civil war and guiding the al-Qaeda rebs.

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From http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8404827/Libya-Now-we-must-arm-the-insurgents-so-that-Gaddafi-can-be-toppled.html

Libya: Now we must arm the insurgents so that Gaddafi can be toppled

Liberation can only be achieved by a transformation of the status and powers of those who have risen against Gaddafi. That will require three important decisions to be taken by Britain and the international community.

First, we must stop referring to the anti-Gaddafi fighters as "rebels". Describing them as such implies that the Gaddafi regime is still some sort of legitimate government. It is not. The regime has, effectively, become an outlaw in the eyes of the Libyan people, of the Arab world and of the international community. As it is no longer legitimate, those fighting against it are no longer rebels. They are best described as insurgents or opposition fighters.

Second, although it is too early to recognise the Libyan opposition as an alternative government, the United Kingdom, and other nations, must enter into formal discussions with the Libyan National Council, as the representative of the insurgents, and facilitate the early supply not only of humanitarian aid, but also of advice and help on how to create the institutions of government, the rule of law and a free media. That is not only urgently needed, but would help ensure that the ultimate replacement for Gaddafi would be a new government supportive of democratic reform, rather than one willing to install a new secular or religious tyranny.

But there is a third arm of the strategy, without which the others will have only modest impact: the overt or covert supply of military equipment to the insurgents. Even without aircraft, Gaddafi has a massive advantage over the opposition with his tanks and heavy artillery. It is difficult to see how he can be overthrown in the short to medium term unless there is a massive popular rising in Tripoli or a mass defection of his army to the insurgents. Neither is impossible, but nor can either be assumed given the fear that Gaddafi still inspires.