BETHMANN-HOLLWEG TRIED TO PUSH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY INTO WAR WHILE WILHELM SLEPT IN HIS BERLIN BED

Bethmann Hollweg kept Serbia's response to Austria-Hungary from Wilhelm until it was too late.

His all-highest Majesty, Kaiser Wilhelm II of the German Empire, rose early on the 28th to go for a ride outside the Neues Palace at Potsdam. When he returned to his desk he turned his attention to the Serbian response to Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum. Belgrade’s reply, which had been immediately rejected by Vienna in the latter’s determination to go to war, had only been received in Berlin the night before. In a bid to keep their master from intervening before Austria-Hungary could declare war at Noon Tuesday, Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Foreign Secretary Jagow had neglected to wake the Kaiser and show him the reply. Their concern is entirely justified when the Kaiser reads it, as Sean McMeekin writes in July 1914:

While he already suspected that the tone of the reply would be reasonably conciliatory, Wilhelm was floored when he read it. “A brilliant achievement in a time limit of only forty-eight hours!” he scribbled, declaring Serbia’s near-total compliance “more than one could have expected!” and “a great moral success for Vienna.” With Prime Minister Pasic’s reply, he deduced, “all reason for war is gone, and Giesl [the Austrian ambassador to Serbia] ought to have quietly stayed on in Belgrade!” Receiving such a reply, he wrote, “I should never have ordered mobilization.”

The Kaiser immediately writes and dispatches a formal note to Jagow, requesting that Germany ask Austria-Hungary to negotiate with Serbia on the basis of their reply to the ultimatum. This is precisely what British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey had proposed to the German ambassador to Britain the day before, although Wilhelm was probably unaware of this that morning. In order to make sure the Serbs agreed to negotiate the Kaiser proposed the Austrian army temporarily occupy Belgrade, thus satisfying Austrian “honor” for revenging his friend Franz Ferdinand’s murder, until agreement was reached. “[Should that happen] I am ready to mediate for peace in Austria,” the Kaiser wrote to Jagow. He dispatches his note at 10AM, Berlin time.

That Wilhelm was a highly erratic, impulsive egotist who frequently posed as a belligerent warrior-king, which in turn undermined his country’s foreign policy and heightened tensions in pre-1914 Europe, underlines his personal responsibility for commencing the crisis by issuing Vienna its “blank check” earlier that month. Yet it is also true that, as an autocrat, he had the power in theory to decide whether his country went to war. On July 28th Wilhelm believed that theory to be fact, part of his divine right to rule his empire as he saw fit. The next week would open his eyes to the reality of his position and power.

As it is the Kaiser’s memo to Jagow comes too late to stop Vienna from officially declaring war. The Kaiser’s unease with using the relatively newfangled telephone installed in the Neues Palace means that his order is not received immediately in Berlin, but by courier nearly 2 hours later. For his part Jagow chooses not to include the Kaiser’s mediation offer in informing his Austrian counterpart, Count Berchtold of his master’s message later that day. Jagow, Bethmann and their government counterparts have been urging Vienna to declare war that Tuesday in order to short-circuit any 11th hour diplomatic intervention. Field Marshall Moltke joins them in this by putting pressure on his counterpart, General Conrad. Getting Austria-Hungary to initiate the conflict is only 1 battle of a prolonged, personal war the Kaiser’s ministers will wage with their master in the week ahead.

Bethmann scores one more victory for the war party before the day is out. Aware of the potential for mass strikes led by the Social Democratic Party – part of the 2nd International’s policy of a European-wide strike to block a European war from happening – Bethmann meets with the SDP’s leaders in Berlin. Concerned about the much-dreaded Russian military plowing its way into Prussia and sowing death and destruction in its wake en route to Berlin, the SDP agrees to support the government if Russia declares war on Germany.

[source : Countdown to World War I: July 28, 1914, Daily Kos, http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/07/28/1317331/-Countdown-to-World-War-I-July-28-1914

The official communication from Wilhelm to Foreign Minister Jagow (a co-warmonger of Bethmann-Hollweg) is:

AH ought to be satisfied with S reaction provided real guarantees obtained eg partial occupation and payment of three sets of mobilisation costs.

So not only does Bethmann-Hollweg:
1. send Wilhelm to Norway;
2. then keep Wilhlem out of the loop while Austria-Hungary, with Germany's cooperation, develop the ultimatum to Serbia and then deliver it;
3. then encourages Austria-Hungary to go to war on Serbia on 26th July while Wilhelm is on his way back to Berlin to sort out the mess that Bethmann-Hollweg had created,

he then keeps the Serbian reply from Wilhelm so that Austria-Hungary can declare war on Serbia before Wilhelm can sympathise with Serbia and restrain Austria-Hungary?!

WTF?!

Why did Wilhelm put up with Bethmann-Hollweg? Could Wilhelm have sacked Bethmann-Hollweg?

But then how can this warmongering by Bethmann-Hollweg be reconciled with that speech he gave on 2nd December 1914 in which he blamed Great Britain for the war?

And why didn't they just use the phone?